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man, really think and want?"—and should find that all his interest revolved round the two ideas of life and death. Conclusions arrived at by some such process of self-questioning Unamuno expresses with a robustness and a complete sincerity that give to many of his sayings a powerful stimulus, an almost painful interest. Just this note of earnestness has hardly been heard before.

The book as a whole is a bit incoherent; it resembles in form one of the prophetic books of the Old Testament; it is, after all, difficult to formulate, except in the vaguest terms, Unamuno's final philosophy. But the harsh, downright, and penetrating assertions with which the book is filled, its mere outcries, may find entrance into one's mind and suddenly alter one's whole point of view. And the point of view that Unamuno violently forces upon us finally is this: that the tragic conflict between heart and head is not the obstacle to ethics, but the very foundation of ethics; ethics is the product of this struggle. We come out with the robust doctrine that all virtue is based upon "uncertainty, doubt, perpetual wrestling with the mystery of our final destiny, mental despair, and the lack of any solid and stable dogmatic foundation." Try to base virtue upon certainty, and it ceases to be virtue; base it on dogma and it becomes fanaticism.

All this is Unamuno's profoundly human, distressingly sincere version of James's Pragmatism—a "will to believe" energized by deep instincts. "Conduct, practice," avers the author, "is the proof of doctrine, theory. 'If any man will do His will,' said Jesus, 'he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God or whether I speak of myself.'"

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, whatever may be one's philosophical attitude, to miss reading this book would be as great a loss as not to have read *Sartor Resartus*.

SECRET DIPLOMACY. By Paul S. Reinsch. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

The core of Mr. Reinsch's book is his criticism of secret diplomacy as it operated in the period of incubation of the World War. Compared with this, his earlier chapters are but leisurely and entertaining explorations of the past, satisfying curiosity, but not vitally affecting present problems. The conceptions of Machiavelli scarcely need rehearsing, and no reader acquainted with European history in the most general terms needs to examine the diplomatic methods of Talleyrand and Metternich in order to become convinced that secret diplomacy is a historical survival from the period of the absolutist state. Without disparaging historic research, one may say that these things, as treated by Mr. Reinsch, in a book intended for general reading, are of little more than antiquarian interest. For the purpose of producing broader convictions by building up a historic background, a method resembling that of Mr. Wells's celebrated *Outline* would perhaps be more effective than the somewhat detailed and anecdotal method adopted by Mr. Reinsch.

If it be true that secret diplomacy, *not only in Germany and Austria-Hungary*, but also among the Allies was one of the causes but for which the war might have been prevented, then nothing else relating to the subject is relatively of much importance.

Of Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Reinsch writes: "Thus a minister, to whom national intrigue and duplicity were essentially foreign, who was trusted by his country and who wanted peace, was brought by the methods of secret diplomacy into a position where he had actually incurred the moral obligation to assist another country without having the power for peace which the ability to avow that relationship openly, to take the responsibility, and to confront Germany therewith would have given him."

If this be true, then England and France must share with Germany, in some degree, responsibility for the war!

Here is the point that needs the fullest discussion—a point on which previous diplomatic history throws comparatively little light. Profitably pursued, it would seem to lead directly into the broader question of the present conception of nationality. If secret diplomacy is a survival of the absolutist state, it is sustained to-day by a selfish and jealous nationalism, and it is with causes rather than symptoms that we should chiefly concern ourselves.

There would seem to be, therefore, an unconscious disproportion in Mr. Reinsch's book; yet the work contains much information and much clear statement. To the objection that delicate negotiations may be hampered by publicity, the author answers that we need more of Lincoln's faith in the plain people; and he encourages the belief that the discrediting of secret diplomacy and its gradual abandonment may be more effective in removing the causes of both war and international intrigue than persons rendered cynical by the results of the peace may be inclined to think. At a certain stage in civilization publicity becomes at once possible, necessary, and effective in order to secure the ends of society.

WHAT NEXT IN EUROPE? By Frank A. Vanderlip. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

It is apparently hard for Americans to realize the extent of the calamity that has overtaken Europe as the result of the war and as a result of the peace. This difficulty of comprehension is in part due to that general "economic illiteracy" (an excellent phrase which Mr. Vanderlip has contributed to the current discussion) which we share with other peoples, and in part to the difficulty we experience in thinking internationally: the misfortunes of others may easily be minimized. However obvious it may be that immense destruction of life and property means dead loss to the world, and that economic anarchy must result from the arbitrary process of carving out political states without regard for economic boundaries, few of us realize that European civilization is threatened with destruction.